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CHARLES BLACK'S REDISCOVERY OF THE 
NINTH AMENDMENT, AND WHAT HE 
FOUND THERE 
Russell L. Caplan* 
DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW. By Charles L. Black, Jr. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1981. Pp. 83. $12.95., 
In the quarter century since Bennett Patterson revived The For-
gotten Ninth Amendment, 1 analysis of that amendment2 has ad-
vanced in three stages. Before 1965, writers3 devoted themselves to 
exhuming the relic and extolling its value for the promotion of indi-
vidual rights. Then Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,4 which found a right to marital privacy 
supported by the language and history of the ninth amendment, sud-
denly made the amendment respectable. Griswold spurred consider-
able literature5 on the nature and role of the ninth amendment, 
particularly with regard to claims concerning personal privacy. Fi-
nally, with the passing of the Warren Court into history, a third van-
guard6 has emerged. This new cadre assumes that Griswold is here 
* Attorney, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice. A.B. Dartmouth, 1972: 
B.A. Oxford, 1974: J.D. Yale, 1977. - Ed. 
1. B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955). 
2. The ninth amendment provides: ''The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. 
amend. IX. 
3. See, e.g., E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (1957); B. 
PATTERSON, supra note 1; Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 
627 (1956); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights • •• Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 787 (1962). Earlier scholarly and judicial attention to the ninth amendment was sparse. 
Justice Jackson allowed that the rights alluded to in the ninth amendment "are still a mystery 
to me." R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 75 
(1955). 
4. 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring,joined by Warren, C.J., & Brennan, 
J.). 
5. See, e.g., Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119; 
Symposium on the Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965); 
Comment, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 814 (1966), 
6. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34-41 (1980); Paust, Human Rights and the 
Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975); Ringold, The 
History of the Enactment of the ninth amendment and Its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L. J. 1 
(1972). For challenges to the expansionist trend, see Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1 (1980); Note, The Right of Privacy: A Black View of Griswold v. Connecticut, 7 
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1980). 
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to stay and invokes the ninth amendment as a basis for preserving 
and expanding individual rights, and so continues the work of that 
Court. 
I 
Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., who teaches at Yale, explicitly 
aligns himself (p. 44) with those who look to the ninth amendment as 
a reservoir of individual freedoms.7 The substance of Black's expen-
sive book was delivered as the Holm.es Lectures at Harvard Law 
School in April 1979. Like his predecessors in this distinguished lec-
ture series - Learned Hand,8 Herbert Wechsler,9 Alexander Bick-
el10 - Black addresses the contradictions inherent in a 
representative, constitutional democracy that includes a powerful, 
tenured, nonelected federal judiciary. In so doing, Black reprises 
themes he sounded twenty years before in a frankly impassioned de-
fense of the Warren Court, The People and the Court. u Then, as 
now, there were threats to strip the court of its jurisdiction over cer-
tain kinds of cases.12 Then, as now, Black's primary defense of the 
Court, and by implication the federal court system, is that the peo-
ple, through their elected congressional representatives, have author-
ized the Court to live and thrive. 13 The system has worked for the 
most part extraordinarily well, Brown v. Board of Education being 
the chief case in point (p. 15). Defending judicial review of state acts 
is in any event far less a problem than defending federal judicial 
review of federal acts, since the supremacy clause14 and common 
7. Black is right to wonder "if indeed [Professor Ely) did not himself make the motion 
[urging acceptance of the ninth amendment)." P. 44. The extent of Ely's commitment is diffi-
cult to discern exactly, which is worth remembering in the midst of academic parsing of things 
like the legislative history of the Reconstruction amendments. 
8. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). 
9. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 13 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
10. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970; 2d ed. 1978). 
I I. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960) [hereinafer cited as PEOPLE AND THE 
COURT]. . 
12. See, e.g., Can Congress Curtail Federal Court Power?, 61 A.B.A.J. 1095 (1981). 
13. Seep. 18; PEOPLE AND THE COURT, supra note 11, at 2-3; 23-25; C. BLACK, THE OCCA-
SIONS OF JUSTICE 70-77 (1963). See generally L. LEVY, Judicial Review, History and JJemoc-
racy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT l, 12 (1967); 
McCleskey, Judicial Review in a JJemocracy: A JJissenting Opinion, 3 Hous. L. REv. 354, 357-
59, 362-64 (1966). 
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
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sense indicate that matters committed to the Federal Constitution 
should not be left to the interpretations of the individual states. 15 
Another topic to which Black returns is the confusion about the 
potential for judicial interventionism, an "imperial" judiciary, be-
cause of the nonobjective nature of legal values and reasoning (pp. 
20-23).16 Judges must decide cases not according to whim but ac-
cording to law; yet, "[e]verything we know of law ... warns us that 
we must not look, in its reasonings, for the rigor of mathematics or of 
the sciences" (pp. 20-21). "[C]onstitutional law, like all law," Black 
continues, "employs methods beyond textual interpretation - the 
method of analogy with the textual provision, the method of infer-
ence from the structures and relationships created by the text, and -
in developed law - the method of following precedent" (p. 23). 
Two decades ago, Black unabashedly faced the tensions of a de-
mocracy that chooses a federal court system. Despite the potential 
for abuse, Black said, the judiciary had proved to be an overwhelm-
ingly beneficial institution. 17 "[l]t will work if we want it to work 
and will fail if we want it to fail." 18 The creativity of judges within 
the interstices of the political fabric allows and requires the exercise 
of "insight and wisdom and justice."19 Black concluded: 
Judicial review cannot be defended as a mechanical process. But it can 
be defended as a prudent and wise allocation of the power of deciding 
certain questions ... Underneath all I have said is the conviction that 
"decision according to law" can be a meaningful phrase, even when 
the decision in question is made by something other than a machine, or 
even a mathematician.20 
Twenty years ago, then, Black was convinced that expansive consti-
tutional interpretation was not necessarily tantamount to rule by 
judicial fiat. 
Now, Black offers up the ninth amendment as a means of ensur-
ing rigorous legal reasoning, especially for cases "in which actions of 
the state claimed to be inimical to national constitutional rights are 
overturned on the basis of norms not literally expressed in the Con-
stitution" (p. 43). The ninth amendment, Black is quick to say, is 
superior to the due process21 and equal protection22 clauses as a 
15. See p. 36; PEOPLE AND THE COURT, supra note 11, at 122-29. 
16. Id. at 156-82. 
17. Id. at 2-3. See generally Black, The ll'!finished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. 
L. REV. 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Unfinished Business]. 
18. PEOPLE AND THE COURT, supra note 11, at 107. 
19. Id. at 182. 
20. Id. 
21. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § l. 
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
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source of substantive rights because "due process," particularly the 
"substantive" kind, cannot sustain many of the constructions that 
have been given it "without rudest violence to ordinary meaning" (p. 
45), and "equal protection" doctrine does not go far enough {pp. 45-
46). He would reject the "new" equal protection for a determination 
that sex discrimination is not somewhat, but exactly analogous to 
racial discrimination, and flatly prohibited under the aegis of the 
ninth amendment (p. 73). Curiously, though, he adds that "if for 
some reason you do still prefer 'equal protection' or 'due process,' 
there need be no substantive quarrel between us, ever" (p. 48). 
The content of the ninth amendment, says Black, "is to be con-
structed by reasoned operations" (p. 59). By such means, "every 
structural or analogic derivation of an unwritten personal right can 
be restated . . . as a derivation of a Ninth Amendment right . . . . 
This setting up of an atmosphere hospitable to the establishment of 
unnamed rights is a natural function of the Ninth Amendment's 
words" {p. 48).23 But beyond the substance gleaned from structure 
and analogy, Black posits a "pure" ninth amendment with its own 
content, and "there is nothing more eligible for inclusion than pro-
tection of what I will call, meaning to use the term in a wide sense, 
the marriage and parent-child interest" (p. 66). The ninth amend-
ment's special contribution, says Black, is to ask whether a particular 
interest is "worthy of protection" in our constitutional system (p. 53), 
and "perhaps above its other merits, makes possible fully rational 
discourse in the formation of personal rights law, toward the con-
struction of a coherent system."24 
II 
Beneath the assertion that the ninth amendment is "a fountain of 
law" (p. 44 n.47) lies the unvoiced assumption that a constitutional 
amendment, indeed a part of the original Bill of Rights, must con-
tain some substantive rights of its own. Yet not even Justice 
Goldberg in Griswold went so far, as he carefully explained: 
23. See Unfinished Business, supra note 17, at 43 ("the ninth amendment ... [can] best be 
given content by the method of analogy to more specific constitutional guarantees"); Redlich, 
supra note 3, at 812 ("the Ninth and Tenth Amendments should be used to define rights adja-
cent to or analogous to, the pattern of rights which we find in the Constitution"). 
24. P. 53 (emphasis deleted). Such a strategy recalls Black's appeal to rights unnamed in 
the Constitution but necessary to fill out the governmental structure that the text has created. 
See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). Black now 
acknowledges the haven that the ninth amendment can give such unnamed rights. See p. 44 n. 
48. 
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Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an in-
dependent source of rights protected from infringement by either the 
States or the Federal Government. Rather, the Ninth Amendment 
shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights 
exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments 
and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed 
exhaustive. 25 
The history of the ninth amendment, sketchy as it is, bears this out. 
The absence of a bill of rights was probably the most formidable 
obstacle to the Constitution's ratification, and the promise of amend-
ments may well have secured the critical margin of approval.26 
Madison's original version of what became the ninth amendment, 
submitted on May 4, 1789, read: 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of 
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just im-
portance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the 
powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of 
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.27 
In support of his proposal, Madison stated: 
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating 
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those 
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow, 
by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were in-
tended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and 
were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible argu-
ments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights 
into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against . . . 
[by this amendment].28 
Justice Joseph Story, appointed to the Supreme Court by President 
Madison and intimately familiar with his thought on the subject, 
later wrote of the amendment that it 
25. 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Douglas later agreed that "[t]he 
Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally enforceable rights." Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179, 210 (1973) (concurring opinion). 
26. See Comment, supra note 5, at 820. 
27. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 452 (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1834), quoted in Berger, supra 
note 6, at 8; Comment, supra note 5, at 821. The amendment seems derived from the seven-
teenth resolution proposed by the Virginia ratification convention of 1788: 
That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers, be not 
interpreted, in any manner whatsoever, to extend the powers of Congress; but that they be 
construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the case, 
or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution. 
3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED· 
ERAL CONSTITUTION 661 (1861), quoted in E. DUMBAULD, supra note 3, at 188. In a 1788 letter 
to Jefferson, Madison pronounced himself "in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed 
as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration." Quoted in Kelly, supra 
note 5, at 152. 
28. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 27, at 456, quoted in 381 U.S. at 489-90; Berger, 
supra note 6, at 7; Comment, supra note 5, at 821. 
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was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse or ingenious misap-
plication of the well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular 
cases implies a negation in all others; and, e converso, that a negation 
in particular cases implies an affirmation in all others . . . . The 
amendment was undoubtedly suggested by the reasoning of the Feder-
alist on the subject of a general bill of rights.29 
Clearly the author of the ninth amendment intended it to be merely 
a rule of construction, operating to preserve previously established 
rights; there is no indication that it was to be an independent source 
of substantive rights. 
The reasoning of the Federalist on a bill of rights is contained in 
Numbers 83 and 84, where Hamilton leaves clues suggesting that 
unenumerated rights are to be closely identified with existing state 
constitutions, statutes, and common law. Hamilton was partly con-
cerned with refuting the antifederalist argument that without a bill 
of rights any right not mentioned in the Constitution would be abol-
ished. The specific argument that Hamilton chose to rebut in the 
first essay is the contention that since the Constitution provides for 
jury trials in criminal cases30 but not in civil, trial by jury in civil 
cases would be eliminated.31 Hamilton stated that the Constitution's 
"specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a 
general legislative authority,"32 and concluded: 
[T]rial by jury is in no case abolished by the proposed constitution, and 
it is equally true that in those controversies between individuals in 
which the great body of the people are likely to be interested, that insti-
tution will remain precisely in the same situation in which it is placed 
by the state constitutions, and will be in no degree altered or influenced 
by the adoption of the plan under consideration. The . . . national 
judiciary will have no cognizance of them, and of course they will re-
main determinable as heretofore by the state courts only, and in the 
manner which the state constitutions and laws prescribe.33 
Again, the intent to have the ninth amendment operate only as a rule 
of construction to protect rather than generate rights seems 
established. 
Hamilton's next essay, Federalist Number 84, reveals why the 
framers felt that something like the ninth amendment was necessary 
29. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTlTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 651 (5th 
ed. 1891) (1st ed. 1833). 
30. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 559 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See generally G. Wooo, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 539-43 (1969). 
32. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 83 at 560. 
33. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 83 at 561. Hamilton adds later that the omission 
was due at least in part to the different provisions in the various states for jury trials, thus 
"leaving the matter as it has been left, to legislative regulation." Id. at 567. 
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at all. The New York antifederalists, he wrote, had defended their 
state's constitution, though it, too, contained no express bill of rights: 
"[I]t contains in the body of it various provisions in favour of partic-
ular privileges and rights ... [and] the constitution adopts in their 
full extent the common law and statute law of Great-Britain, by 
which many other rights not expressed in it are equally secured."34 
Hence the Bill of Rights was designed to quell apprehensions about 
losing under the new Constitution the kinds of rights long enjoyed 
and protected by state or common law.35 The rights Madison sought 
to preserve in the ninth amendment were generally those set down 
and readily accessible in the treatises of Coke and Blackstone and in 
landmark documents such as the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights 
of 1689. Madison certainly gave short shrift to any notions of un-
written "natural" law in his draft. 36 The notion of unenumerated 
rights thus drew upon a shared understanding of relatively specific, 
written legal principles, which background argues powerfully against 
an activist recourse to the ninth amendment as a bottomless well of 
last resort. Despite the slender historical record, therefore, it is fairly 
clear that the ninth amendment "was intended to . . . negate the 
[anti-]Federalist argument that the enumeration of certain rights 
would imply the forfeiture of all others. The ninth is simply a rule of 
construction, applicable to the entire Constitution."37 
III 
Far from being the "hospitable environment" for new rights -
mainly those in the area of personal privacy, a la Griswold (pp. 65-
66) - the ninth amendment expressly directs the courts to look else-
where than its own text for the root of any substantive, dispositive 
right. It is, in fact, probably counterdemocratic to strike down a stat-
34. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 31, No. 84 at 575. 
35. Madison believed that "the great mass of people who opposed [the Constitution], dis-
liked it because it did not contain effectual provisions against the encroachments on particular 
rights, and those safeguards which they have been long accustomed to have interposed be-
tween them and the magistrate who exercises the sovereign power . . . ." I ANNALS OF CON· 
GRESS, supra note 27, at 450. 
36. See Kelly, supra note 5, at 154-55; Dunbar, supra note 3, at 640 n.47. Madison placed 
significant emphasis on written law as a guarantee of liberty in responding to the objection that 
a bill of rights would be superfluous "upon the presumption that the people have those rights 
in their own hands, and that is the proper place for them to rest. It would be a sufficient 
answer to say, that this objection lies against such provisions under the State Governments, as 
well as under the General Government; and there are, I believe, but few gentlemen who are 
inclined to push their theory so far as to say that a declaration of rights in those cases is either 
ineffectual or improper." I ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 27, at 455. 
37. Comment, supra note 5, at 835. See B. DUMBAULD, supra note 3, at 63-64; Ringold, 
supra note 6, at 10; Kelly, supra note 5, at 154-55. 
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ute on the basis of a constitutional text so devoid of content.38 To 
make the amendment the repository of all rights deemed "worthy of 
protection" risks circumventing the amending process envisioned in 
article V. At least broad penumbras are the shadows of substantive 
amendments, compelling, as Black would want, the completion of 
the scheme of government contemplated by the Constitution. Fluid 
as the "liberty" component of the due process clause is (p. 47 n.58), 
its history and glosses provide sounder footing for reasoned analysis 
than an amendment never meant to be a starting point for adjudica-
tion in the first place. Laurence Tribe recently analyzed various the-
ories that aim to uncover the fundamental rights implicit in the 
Constitution, and concluded: "None of the theories offered to date is 
wholly satisfying."39 That conclusion still holds. 
Black's point that the ninth amendment is an acceptable textual· 
basis for the reasoned derivation of individual rights, certainly no 
more nebulous than any other clause or amendment (pp. 49, 51), is 
therefore doomed. There is nothing there to reasonfrom. Black's 
theory seems to be: if the proposed interest is similar enough to an-
other amendment (p. 50), and the interest is "worthy of protection" 
(p. 53), then there is a niche for it in the ninth amendment. But this 
turns analogical reasoning on its head. The purpose of reasoning by 
analogy is to discover whether a sufficient similarity exists, not to 
find a residuary clause in which to tuck away appealing principles 
that fall short. 
Rendering decisions according to law is of course demonstrative 
and not strictly deductive, but demonstration requires a persuasive 
source for the first step in a chain of reasoning. The ninth amend-
ment alone is not that source. 
38. See Cahn, The Parchment Barriers, AM. SCHOLAR, Winter 1962-1963, at 21, reprinted 
in CONFRONTING INJUSTICE 104 (L. Cahn ed. 1962); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution 
Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1059 (1977). The tenth amendment, 
sometimes paired with the ninth amendment in discussion, reserves powers not delegated to 
the federal government "to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
The tenth, in contrast to the ninth amendment, has a substantial textual hook because interpre-
tation can focus on the powers appropriate to the states operating as independent entities, 
"states qua states,'' vis-a-vis the federal government. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). 
39. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 573 (1978). 
